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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt matu-
rity. We build upon the argument that managerial overconfidence is likely to miti-
gate the underinvestment problem, which is often the major concern for long-term
debt investors. Within this context, we hypothesise that managerial overconfidence
increases debt maturity. Our empirical evidence, based on time-varying measures of
overconfidence derived from computational linguistic analysis and directors’ dealings
in their own companies’ shares, supports this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that
the changes in both first person singular pronouns and optimistic tone are positively
related to the change indebtmaturity.Moreover,we find that the insider trading-based
overconfidence of CEO, who is most likely to influence investment decision and thus
the underinvestment problem, has a stronger impact on debt maturity than the over-
confidence of other directors (e.g. CFO). Overall, our study provides initial evidence
for a positive overconfidence-debtmaturity relation via overconfidencemitigating the
agency cost of long-term debt.
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1. Introduction
Initial work highlights that managerial overconfidence often leads to sub-optimal corporate financial decisions
(e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008).1 In contrast, some behavioural finance theories (Shefrin 2007; Hack-
barth 2009) suggest that managerial overconfidence can have a positive impact by reducing agency problems
(e.g. debt overhang or underinvestment problem). However, empirical analysis supporting a positive impact of
overconfidence is limited.2 We fill this gap by examining the debt maturity decision and providing evidence that
managerial overconfidence significantly increases debt maturity. This is in line with managerial overconfidence
mitigating the agency costs of long-term debt, namely the underinvestment problem (Myers 1977).3 An impor-
tant policy implication of our finding is that the presence of overconfident managers may give firms freedom to
choose their debt maturity structure instead of relying heavily on short-term debt as a mechanism to alleviate
the underinvestment problem (see Barclay and Smith 1995).
Given that debt maturity structure is an important element of the corporate financing strategy pursued by
managers to influence their firms’ cost of capital (e.g. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler 2003), it is important to
determine whether overconfident managers’ tendency to underestimate risks associated with their firms’ future
prospects affect debt maturity. More specifically, our study is motivated by two strands of literature. On one
hand, the behavioural finance literature suggests thatmanagerial overconfidence canmitigate some agency prob-
lems including the underinvestment problem (Hackbarth 2009). On the other hand, it is well established that
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agency problems are apparent in the debt maturity setting and that, for example, shortening debt maturity may
reduce the underinvestment problem (e.g. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980). Combining these two strands of
literature, it is plausible that a particular agency problem is the underlying channel through which managerial
overconfidence affects debt maturity. This is the first study that examines the overconfidence-debt maturity
relation from an agency perspective. We augment the emergent literature on the link between managerial
overconfidence and debt maturity in four ways.
First, we develop a new hypothesis thatmanagerial overconfidence increases debtmaturity. This is in contrast
to two previous studies. Landier and Thesmar (2009) show that overconfident managers rely on short-term debt
in order to benefit from their overconfident beliefs about their firms’ prospects. From the information asymme-
try perspective, Huang, Tan, and Faff (2016) argue that managerial overconfidence is associated with perceived
information advantage and hypothesise that overconfident managers prefer short-term debt since it is less sub-
ject to the perceived mispricing. We contribute to this literature by examining the relation between managerial
overconfidence and debt maturity from agency perspectives. Building upon Hackbarth (2009), we argue that
the presence of overconfident managers, who invest earlier and more than their rational counterparts because
they underestimate the value of the option-to-wait, alleviates the underinvestment problem that is tradition-
ally considered as a key reason behind firms’ reliance on short-term debt. We thus hypothesise that managerial
overconfidence increase debt maturity. Our empirical analysis, based on the 192 public listed UK firms during
2000–2010, supports this hypothesis.
Second, unlike the existing empirical studies that use time-invariant measures of overconfidence (e.g.
Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013), we examine the impact of various time-varying measures of managerial over-
confidence on corporate debtmaturity structure. This is important because the overconfidence level ofmanagers
is likely to change over time due to the self-attribution bias (SAB), which is defined as the tendency to attribute
success (failure) to own ability (external factors) (Miller and Ross 1975). From this perspective, asmanagers tend
to attribute their companies’ success to their own abilities, they learn to become overconfident.4 Consequently,
the use of static measures of overconfidence in the literature may be misleading and imprecise. Our empirical
analysis addresses this issue by examining the relation between several time-varying measures of managerial
overconfidence and debt maturity.
Third, unlike the existing literature on overconfidence and debt maturity that relies primarily on survey-
based5 measures of overconfidence, we employ ‘words-based measures’, as well as, ‘action-based measures’
of managerial overconfidence. Our ‘words-based measures’ capture ‘what managers say’ and our ‘action-
based measures’ capture ‘what managers do’ and both their words and actions may reflect their overconfident
beliefs. As we explain in detail in Section 3, our ‘words-based measures’ are derived using the computational
linguistic analysis of the Chairman’s Statement in firms’ annual reports, while our ‘action-based measures’
are based upon directors’ dealings in their own firms’ shares. An additional benefit of our action-based
measures is that they enable us to examine whether the identity of the overconfident managers matters.
Specifically, we show that the link between debt maturity and overconfidence is primarily due to CEO
overconfidence.
Finally, we examine further if the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation is contingent upon invest-
ment opportunities and the level of existing debt. Specifically, our analysis shows that the link between
overconfidence and debt maturity is greater for firms with more growth options in their investment oppor-
tunities. This is an important finding given that the literature (e.g. Barclay and Smith 1995) suggests that firms
with more growth options rely on short-term debt due to the underinvestment problem. In addition, our find-
ings show that the relation between overconfidence and debt maturity depends on existing leverage. We argue
that high leveragemay reduce firms’ ability to raise new debt, which, in turn, limits the impact of overconfidence
on debt maturity decision.
To summarise, this study provides the important new finding that managerial overconfidence, as indicated
by their words and trading activities, increases debt maturity. Our further analysis confirms that the channel
through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity is the underinvestment problem rather than
other agency problems (e.g. risk-shifting and overinvestment problems). Our findings are largely robust to alter-
native measures of debt maturity and overconfidence, and alternative estimation methods. Overall, our study
suggests that overconfidence can be a desirable managerial trait in the sense that it mitigates the agency costs
of debt.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the standard and
behavioural determinants of debt maturity and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes methodology and data.
Section 4 discusses empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Related research and hypotheses
2.1. The determinants of corporate debtmaturity structure
Why do some firms raise long-term debt while others rely on short-term debt? Within Modigliani-Miller’s per-
fect capital markets setting, any variation in debt maturity structure is irrelevant to the firm value (Brick and
Ravid 1985). However, early literature on corporate debt maturity argues that in the presence of various market
imperfections, such as information asymmetries and agency problems, short-termdebtmay be optimal for some
firms. For example, building upon Myers (1977), Barclay and Smith (1995) argue that due to the agency cost of
debt ‘firm with more growth options in their investment opportunity sets have less long-term debt in their cap-
ital structure’ (609) because short-term debt enables managers to undertake investments without transferring
benefits to existing debt-holders. Within this context, short-term debt acts as a solution to the underinvestment
problem. Using market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth options in firms’ investment opportunities, Bar-
clay and Smith (1995) find support for the above argument. Overall, the traditional finance literature focuses
primarily on various firm characteristics (e.g. firm size, investment opportunities, liquidity, effective tax rate
and earnings volatility) and capital market conditions (e.g. term structure and interest rate volatility) to explain
variations in corporate debt maturity structure (see Stohs and Mauer 1996; Barclay et al. 2003; Johnson 2003;
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal 2006).
In contrast, the ‘behavioural corporate finance’ literature argues that, besides firm and market characteris-
tics mentioned above, managerial overconfidence6 is an important determinant of corporate finance and debt
maturity (see, e.g. Hackbarth 2008, 2009; Landier and Thesmar 2009). We build upon this recent behavioural
corporate finance literature and derive a hypothesis regarding the link between managerial overconfidence and
debt maturity.
2.2. Hypotheses development
2.2.1. Managerial overconfidence increases corporate debtmaturity
Firm value depends not only on its existing assets but also on the optimal exercise of growth options embedded
in its investment opportunities (Myers 1977). Myers (1977) shows that in the presence of risky debt, managers
may decide not to undertake good investment opportunities because some of the value generated by these invest-
ments goes to existing debt-holders. This is the well-known ‘underinvestment problem’ considered as an agency
cost of debt. The underinvestment problem arises because shareholders are unwilling to bear the costs of some
investment that only benefits the debt-holders and it is assumed that managers maximise the equity value rather
than the firm value. Following Myers (1977), several studies examine the significance of short-term debt in
alleviating the underinvestment problem (e.g. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980). Specifically, the literature
suggests that, due to the underinvestment problem, firms rely on short-term debt that matures ‘before an invest-
ment option is to be exercised’ (Myers 1977, 158) because it reduces managers’ incentives to forgo investment
opportunities that increase firm value (Barclay and Smith 1995).
Managerial overconfidence may play a role in alleviating the underinvestment problem that creates a
wedge between debt-holders’ and managers’ preferences about investment opportunities. We build upon Hack-
barth’s (2009) model that studies the agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders in the presence
of managerial overconfidence. Hackbarth proposes that overconfident managers tend to invest earlier and
more than their rational counterparts. The intuition is that overconfident managers, who have lower per-
ceived uncertainty associated with new projects, underestimate the value of the option-to-wait in order to
obtain more information about the project. This ‘timing effect’, in turn, reduces the underinvestment prob-
lem that arises when managers forgo investment that increase firm value but may not increase shareholders’
wealth.7
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In the traditional finance literature, firms utilise short-term debt in order to alleviate the underinvestment
problem. Building uponHackbarth (2009), we posit thatmanagerial overconfidence increases the degree of con-
gruence between long-termdebt-holders’ andmanagers’ preferences regarding the decisions to undertake future
investment opportunities. This increased congruence in preferences is due to the timing effect that ensures that
overconfident managers invest earlier and more than the rational managers (Hackbarth 2009). Thus, overcon-
fident managers make it less important for firms to rely on short-term debt as a mechanism to alleviate the
underinvestment problem. In contrast, firms with rational managers, who are likely to underinvest, still have to
rely heavily on short-term debt due to the underinvestment problem.
It is important to note that following Hackbarth (2009), we presume that rational debt-holders are able to
distinguish between overconfident and rational managers and, in turn, price long-term and short-term debt
accordingly. Specifically, rational debt-holders anticipate that the underinvestment problem is more severe in
firms with rational managers who value the option-to-wait correctly than firms with overconfident managers.
Consequently, potential debt investors are more willing to offer long-term debt to firms with overconfident
managers who exhibit greater tendency to undertake future investment opportunities. Within this context, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Managerial overconfidence is positively related to debt maturity.
2.2.2. The significance ofmanagers’ identity, investment opportunities and leverage
This section highlights the significance of (1) managers’ identity, (2) future investment opportunities and (3)
existing debt level in determining the relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity structure.
Since we contend that the positive relation between overconfidence and debt maturity is due to the underin-
vestment problem, it is plausible that the director that is most involved in major investment decisions is most
relevant in determining the relation between overconfidence and debt maturity. The existing literature suggests
that CEO has a stronger influence on investment than other directors (e.g. CFO) (Malmendier and Zheng 2012).
Consequently, CEO overconfidence should be of particular importance for debt maturity under the mechanism
outlined for Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is intensified for firms with high
levels of CEO overconfidence.
As noted earlier, the agency cost of debt is exacerbated for firms withmore growth options in their future invest-
ment opportunities (see Barclay and Smith 1995). Thus, firms with future investment opportunities rely on
short-term debt to alleviate the underinvestment problem. Our earlier discussion lays emphasis on the pres-
ence of overconfidentmanagers as amechanism that alleviates the underinvestment problem and, consequently,
increases the availability of long-term debt for firms with overconfident managers. We propose that manage-
rial overconfidence plays a more important role in determining debt maturity for firms with higher future
investment opportunities. The rationale for this is as follows. When firms have very few growth options in
their future investment opportunities, the presence of overconfident managers does little to align the man-
agers’ and long-term debt-holders’ investment preferences. These firms, therefore, receive little or no benefit
from having overconfident managers in terms of their access to long-term debt. However, for firms with more
growth options in their future investment opportunities, the presence of overconfident managers align the
managers’ and long-term debt-holders’ investment preferences by ensuring that managers do not underin-
vest. These firms, therefore, are likely to benefit from having overconfident managers in terms of their access
to long-term debt. Thus, given the importance of future investment opportunities, we propose the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is intensified for firms with high
investment opportunities.
We also note that the link between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity may depend on the exist-
ing corporate debt levels. According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, highly leveraged firms have
high financial distress costs and therefore will be reluctant to and find it difficult to raise additional long-
term debt financing. Within this context, the effectiveness of managerial overconfidence to align managers and
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long-term debt-holders’ investment preferences is reduced. That is, for firms with high existing leverage, man-
agerial overconfidence plays little or no role in enabling firms to raise long-term debt. Thus, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is reduced for firms with high
levels of leverage.
2.2.3. The implications of other agency problems
To develop our main hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), we focus on the agency conflict between shareholders and
bondholders, namely underinvestment problem. It is also important to discuss whether other potential agency
conflicts including risk-shifting (or asset substitution) and overinvestment problem could be the underlying
channels through which managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity.8
Risk-shifting problem: The behavioural finance literature (e.g. Shefrin 2007; Hackbarth 2009) suggests that
managerial overconfidence, in a real-option framework, can mitigate not only the underinvestment problem,
as discussed in our hypothesis development, but also the risk-shifting problem, both of which are share-
holder–bondholder conflicts. The risk-shifting problem may occur when managers attempt to shift risk from
shareholders to bondholders by investing in highly risky projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The purpose
of risk-shifting is often to avoid or postpone firm bankruptcy. This means that the risk-shifting incentive of
managers is more prevalent, especially when a firm is close to bankruptcy or financially distressed. Put differ-
ently, risk-shifting only becomes desirable from shareholders’ perspective when firm performance deteriorates
(e.g. Eisdorfer 2008; Hackbarth 2009). However, overconfident managers, who overestimate firm future per-
formance, tend to underestimate the probability of bankruptcy. This underestimated probability of bankruptcy
due to managerial overconfidence, in turn, increases the option value of waiting to risk-shift in a real-option
model and thus reduces the incentive to shift risk (Hackbarth 2009). Therefore, managerial overconfidence can
mitigate agency costs associated with risk-shifting.
Furthermore, regarding the relationship between debt maturity and risk-shifting problem, prior literature
(e.g. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980; Leland and Toft 1996) suggests that longer-term debt increases the
incentive for risk-shifting, while reducing debt maturity may mitigate the risk-shifting problem. This is primar-
ily because the value of long-term debt is more sensitive to the changes in the value of firm assets than that of
short-term debt. However, managerial overconfidence can mitigate risk-shifting, which makes it less necessary
to use short-term debt to reduce this particular agency problem. Thus, an alternative channel through which
managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity is risk-shifting. If managerial overconfidence increases debt
maturity by mitigating the risk-shifting problem, we expect the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation
to be more pronounced especially for firms that are financially distressed.
Hypothesis 5: The positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is intensified for firms with high
incentives for risk-shifting.
Overinvestment problem: Next, we discuss whether the overinvestment problem, the manager-shareholder
conflicts, can be an alternative explanation of the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation. The overin-
vestment problem refers tomanagers’ tendency to purse their own interests at the expense of shareholders and is
especially severe in firms with more free cash flow (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). Hackbarth (2008)
shows that managerial overconfidence can ameliorate the overinvestment problem. Specifically, overconfident
managers underestimate the financial distress costs associated with debt financing and consequently may use
more debt. The resulting higher debt level reduces the amount of free cash flow available for potential value-
destroying activities of a self-interested manager. Thus, managerial overconfidence reduces overinvestment
problem andmakes it less necessary to enhance themonitoring ofmanagers by usingmore short-termdebt. This
mechanism is also called the ‘leverage effect’ and implies a positive relation between managerial overconfidence
and debt maturity.9 We examine whether the leverage effect works by testing the following relation.
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relation between managerial overconfidence and leverage.
We empirically investigate whether risk-shifting and/or overinvestment can be alternative explanations of our
findings in Section 4.4 where Hypotheses 5 and 6 are tested.
162 A. ATAULLAH ET AL.
3. Themethodology and data
3.1. The empirical model
Following the existing literature on debt maturity (e.g. Barclay and Smith 1995; Stohs and Mauer 1996), we use
the following empirical model:
DMit = β0 + γZit +
n∑
k=1
βkXk,it + υi + εit , (1)
where DMit is a measure of the debt maturity of firm i in year t, Z is a measure of overconfidence, X is the
vector of k control variables, υ i represents time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects, and it is the error
term. Our main interest lies in the coefficient γ , which measure the relation between debt maturity (DM) and
managerial overconfidence (Z). Our DM measure is the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to
total debt. We choose our control variables based on previous debt maturity studies.10 As noted earlier, earlier
empirical studies focus on firm- or market-characteristics that capture the effects of agency cost, liquidity risk
and signalling, maturity matching and tax on debt maturity. Based on this literature, the control variables that
we use (with their predicted signs in parenthesis) are as follows: M/B asset (−) controls for agency cost, asset
maturity (+) controls for maturity matching, firm size (+) controls for bankruptcy costs, liquidity (+) controls
for agency cost, earnings volatility (−) controls for bankruptcy costs, leverage (+) controls for liquidity risk,
abnormal earnings (−) controls for firm quality, tax (+) controls for tax, and price performance (+) controls for
market timing. All the variables are defined in Appendix A.
3.2. Themeasurement ofmanagerial overconfidence
This section describes how we construct the time-varying words-based measures of managerial overconfidence
using computational linguistic analysis and how we gauge different directors’ (e.g. CEO and CFO) confidence
levels based on their dealings in their own firms’ shares.
3.2.1. Words-basedmeasures of overconfidence: first person pronouns
We construct two words-based measures of overconfidence based on computational linguistic analysis of the
UK Chairman’s Statement. The linguistic analysis of financial narratives is becoming increasingly popular in
the academic research. Recent accounting and finance studies use several content analysis software (e.g. Diction,
LIWC and General Inquirer) to analyse various dimensions of narratives11 (e.g. personal pronouns, optimistic
vs. pessimistic, forward-looking).
Our first words-based overconfidencemeasure is related to the use of first person pronouns in the Chairman’s
Statement. Previous accounting research suggests that the presence (absence) of first person pronouns in the US
chief executives’ letters (Hyland 1998) and the UK Chairman’s Statement (Clatworthy and Jones 2006) may
indicate the messengers’ intention to internalise (distance themselves from) good (bad) performance or news.
Li (2010a) proposes a measure of SAB based on the content analysis of MD&A by LIWC software. In particular,
Li uses the ratio of first person pronouns to second- and third-person pronouns in the MD&A as a proxy for
SAB.12 Clatworthy and Jones (2006) point out that the potential for SAB, as measured by first person pronouns,
is enhanced by the unaudited nature of the Chairman’s Statement. Therefore, the UK Chairman’s Statement is
likely to be more suitable than the US MD&A for capturing SAB. In brief, first person pronouns can be utilised
to construct proxies for dynamic self-attribution-induced overconfidence. Following Li (2010a), we use LIWC
software to measure the proportion of first person pronouns (FPP_LIWCit) in the Chairman’s Statement as our
first words-based overconfidence measure as follows:
FPP_LIWCit =
(
Number of FPPit
Total Wordsit
)
∗ 100,
where FPPit represents either first person singular pronouns (I) (e.g. I, me and mine) or first person plural
pronouns (WE) (e.g. we, us and our) for firm i in year t13 and Total Wordsit is the total number of words in the
Chairman’s Statement for firm i in year t.
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The reason why we test the effects of I and WE separately is that previous empirical studies use the sum
of I and WE and the ratio of I to WE as proxies for SAB (Li 2010a) and narcissism,14 respectively, both of
which contribute to managerial overconfidence. Based on the above two operational definitions, the variable I is
positively related to both constructs, however, variableWE is positively related to SAB but negatively related to
narcissism. In brief, the relation between WE and managerial overconfidence might be ambiguous. Therefore,
the results for the variableWE are expected to be more mixed given its differing relations to the components of
managerial overconfidence.15
3.2.2. Words-basedmeasure of overconfidence: tone analysis
Our use of tone analysis is based on the literature that suggests that tone used in corporate disclosures is poten-
tially influenced by ‘manager-specific tendencies toward optimism or pessimism’ (Davis et al. 2015, 671). We
first construct individual tone measures based on the tone analysis16 using the Chairman’s Statement from the
UK annual reports and then construct the composite tone indices.
To construct a composite index of tone, we use six individual wordlists. Our first three wordlists are the same
as those in Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman (2011) and Davis et al. (2015), namely OPTIMISM, TONE_H
and TONE_LM.OPTIMISM is a measure of net optimism17 counted using a dictionary in Diction 6.18 Eshraghi
and Taffler (2012) useOPTIMISM as a measure of fund manager overconfidence. TONE_H and TONE_LM are
twowordlists developed byHenry (2008) and Loughran andMcDonald (2011), respectively, tomeasure positive
and negative words especially in a financial context. In particular, TONE_H and TONE_LM are calculated as
the ratio of the difference between positive and negative words to the sum of positive and negative words.19
In addition to the above measures, we also use CERTAIN1, CERTAIN2 and EMOTION, which are positively
related to optimism. CERTAIN1 and EMOTION20 are measured using dictionaries in LIWC 2007. CERTAIN2
is another measure of certainty21 based on a dictionary in Diction 6. CERTAIN2 has also been used to measure
overconfidence of fund managers (Eshraghi and Taffler 2012). Similarly, Li (2010b) includes ‘uncertain tone’,
which is highly associated with negative tone, in his tone measure. Based on above six individual tone measures,
we form a composite tone index using principal component analysis.We define Tone Indexit as the first principal
components of the correlation matrix of six raw tone measures.22
Tone Indexit =
6∑
j=1
Loadingj ∗ Tone_Xijt
= 0.489Emotionit + 0.162Certain1it + 0.452Optimismit
+ 0.002Certain2it + 0.481Tone_Hit + 0.547Tone_LMit
(2)
where Tone_Xijt represent individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. Loadingj is the loading for individ-
ual tone measure j. The loading for Certain1 and Certain2 is much lower compared with other tone measures.
However, our empirical results are qualitatively similar when we exclude those two measures of certainty tone
from the composite index. Furthermore, to address the concern that the raw tone might be contaminated by
firm-specific variables,23 a composite index of the orthogonalised tone measures is constructed as follows. First,
we regress each individual tone measure on standard determinants of debt maturity. Next, a composite index
(Tone Index⊥it ) is formed based on the first principal component of six residuals (i.e. Tone_X⊥ijt = εijt) from the
above regressions.24
3.2.2.1. Suitability of Chairman’s Statement for the construction of words-based overconfidence and a caveat:.
There are four reasons for using the Chairman’s Statement25 from the UK annual reports as the source of nar-
rative to construct managerial words-based measures. First, Chairman’s Statement is widely read by investors
and analysts (Bartlett and Chandler 1997). Indeed, according to Clatworthy and Jones (2003, 172), Chairman’s
Statement is ‘the most read of the UK’s accounting narratives’ and ‘the longest established’. 26 Second, Chair-
man’s Statement is largely unaudited and not heavily regulated. By contrast, the language used in Directors’
Report is much more formal and standard, largely due to regulatory requirements, and thus is probably less
likely to reflect managers’ behavioural traits. Third, disclosure-related litigation is rare in the UK relative to the
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US. Therefore, the UK accounting narratives (e.g. Chairman’s Statement) are relatively less constrained com-
pared with theMD&A in the US 10-K report. Finally, while Chairman’s Statement is signed by chairman, who is
often a non-executive director in the UK, existing literature27 seems to agree that the Statement communicates
the view of the board rather than the view of the Chairman alone (Clatworthy and Jones 2003, 2006). Thismeans
that firm’s key financial decision makers (e.g. CEO/CFO) also have an influence on the choice of language in
the Chairman’s Statement. Overall, the Chairman’s Statement that is widely read and is not heavily influenced
by accounting/regulatory regimes is likely to allow us to capture the overconfident beliefs of managers.
However, an important caveat of using Chairman’s Statement to gauge seniormanagers’ overconfidencemust
be noted. In our analysis, we implicitly assume that senior managers (e.g. CEO) of all the firms in our sample
have significant and similar impacts on the language used in Chairman’s Statement. However, this assumption
may be unrealistic, because the extent to which the preparation of Chairman’s Statement is influenced by senior
managers may vary from firm to firm. If this is the case, one may argue that Chairman’s Statement reflect the
managerial overconfidence in some, but not all, firms. It is extremely difficult for our empirical analysis to cap-
ture this type of heterogeneity because it is not feasible to investigate how each individual firm prepares their
Chairman’s Statement.28 To summarise, the words-basedmeasures broadly reflect the confidence level of senior
managers. In what follows, we introduce action-based measures which more precisely capture the confidence
level of individual directors.
3.2.3. Action-Basedmeasure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio (NPR)
Our third measure of overconfidence is based on the extent of directors’ trading of their own firms’ shares. The
directors’ trading patterns may reflect their perceptions about the prospects of their firms existing projects and
future investment opportunities (Jenter 2005). Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their firms’ value
and, hence, are more willing to purchase their own firms’ stocks. This trading behaviour can be considered as
managers’ market timing in their personal portfolios. In the spirit of Malmendier and Tate (2005), Jenter (2005)
and Jin andKothari (2008), we use directors’ trading-basedmeasure ofmanagerial overconfidence. In particular,
we construct the valued-based and volume-based NPR using the value and volume of open market purchases
and sales respectively as follows:
NPRit = (Buyit − Sellit)
(Buyit + Sellit) ,
whereNPRit is the value-based (or volume-based) NPR of directors of firm i in fiscal year t. Buyit is the aggregate
value (or volume) of insider purchases and Sellit is the aggregate value (or volume) of insider sales. Besides,
the value-based and volume-based NPRs for individual directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO are also
constructed. TheNPR lies in the interval [−1, 1], with higherNPR indicating highermanagerial overconfidence.
3.3. Estimationmethods
Regarding estimation methods, we initially estimate our empirical model using pooled OLS, fixed effects (FE)
and random effects (RE) estimators. Several diagnostic tests are conducted to decide which estimator is more
suitable. First, the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test favours RE against the pooled OLS. Hausman
test is then conducted to decide between RE and FE estimators, which suggests that FE estimator is superior.
These two tests indicate that the FE estimator seems to bemore appropriate. Our discussion therefore focuses on
the FE estimation results. Furthermore, as robustness checks, we use RE Tobit (RE-Tobit) estimator because our
dependent variable, debt maturity ratio, is bounded between zero and one. In addition, following previous stud-
ies on debt maturity (e.g. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 2005), we also use 2SLS regression where leverage
and debt maturity are simultaneously determined.
3.4. The sample
This study uses data from the following sources. The UK firms’ financial data is obtained from ThomsonWorld-
scope database. Directors’ trading data is sourced from Hemmington Scott database. Chairman’s Statements are
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manually collected from the company annual reports, which are downloaded either through Northcote website
or directly from companywebsites. Our sample of unbalanced panel data is constructed as follows. The selection
of sample period is guided by data availability. All financial and utility firms and firm observations with missing
financial data are excluded. Firms in our sample must have at least three consecutive annual observations to
examine the role of time-varying words-based overconfidence.
To construct words-based measures of overconfidence, we require the digital version of the UK company
annual reports, so that the Chairman’s Statement can be readable by the content analysis software (i.e. LIWC
2007 and Diction 6).29 In addition, to construct insider trading-based measure of overconfidence, only those
firms with insider transactions (i.e. open market purchases and/or sales) for at least three consecutive years are
selected. Besides the NPRs of executive and non-executive directors, we also construct the NPR of individual
directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO. Those directors with joint positions (e.g. CEO duality) or with-
out job title information are excluded from our sample.30 All the NPRs are constructed according to firms’ fiscal
year end. In terms of initial sample sizes and the impacts of various data filters, for financial and accounting
information we obtain a list of the UK public firms (3318 firms) from Worldscope. A list of firms (2024 firms)
with insider trading data is from Hemmington Scott. We exclude financial and utility firms. We then merge the
above two datasets using the SEDOL. The merged dataset includes 1099 firms. Firms with less than three con-
secutive years’ data are dropped and the sample size is reduced to 290 firms. Firms without machine-readable
Chairman’s Statements are also excluded. Firm-years with digital annual reports before the year 2000 are limited
and are therefore excluded. To eliminate the effect of extreme values, all independent variables are winsorised
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample comprises 192 firms and 865 firm-year observations over the
period of 2000–2010.31
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 Panel A shows descriptive statistics of our main variables. The mean of the debt maturity ratio
(LTD/TD) is 0.664. The means of first person singular (I) and plural (WE) pronouns are 0.432 (percent
of total words) and 2.743 (percent of total words), respectively. The total percentage of first person pro-
nouns is therefore 3.175. This figure is much higher than the percentage of first person pronouns in the
MD&A (i.e. 1.27) in Li (2010a). This could be attributed to the fact that the MD&A is more heavily
regulated and subject to auditor’s examination (Li, 2010a) while the Chairman’s Statement is unaudited.
From this perspective, Chairman’s Statement seems to be a more suitable type of financial narrative from
which to measure overconfidence. The mean of Henry’s (2008) tone measure, Tone_H (mean = 0.705),
is higher than that of Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) tone measure, Tone_LM (mean = 0.545). This is
because Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) wordlist includes a more comprehensive list of negative words
than that of Henry (2008). For the insider trading-based measure of overconfidence, on average, the NPRs
of Chairman are the highest, while CEOs’ NPRs are much lower compared with those of Chairman and
CFO.
3.4.2. Correlation analysis
Table 1 Panel B shows the correlation matrix with main variables. The first person pronouns, that is, I and
WE, are positively correlated. Both I and WE are positively correlated with most tone measures. Most of the
tone measures (except Certain2) are positively correlated with each other. For example, Optimism is positively
correlated with all other tone measures. Regarding the correlations between various NPRs, we find that (1)
value-based and volume-based NPRs of the same individual are highly correlated, (2) the correlation between
the NPRs of CEO and CFO is also high and (3) the correlation between the NPRs of Chairman and those of
CEO is relatively low, while the correlation between Chairman and CFO is even lower. These correlation coef-
ficients suggest that Chairman’s trading activities are not perfectly consistent with CEO and especially CFO.
In untabulated correlation analysis, we find positive and statistically significant relations between the debt
maturity ratio and several independent variables including firm size, asset maturity, leverage and price per-
formance, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Both I and WE are positively related to price
performance.32
166 A. ATAULLAH ET AL.
Table 1. Summary statistics and correlation matrix.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
I 865 0.432 0.310 0.453 0.000 3.430
WE 865 2.743 2.730 1.738 0.000 8.400
Net emotion 865 0.731 0.749 0.166 0.069 1.000
Certain1 865 0.991 0.920 0.418 0.000 3.270
Optimism 865 53.334 53.140 2.141 41.080 72.420
Certain2 865 45.606 46.000 3.284 22.550 54.530
Tone_H 865 0.705 0.754 0.241 −1.000 1.000
Tone_LM 865 0.545 0.575 0.296 −1.000 1.000
TONE 865 −0.000 0.192 1.611 −6.560 5.947
VA_CH 448 0.592 1.000 0.778 −1.000 1.000
VA_CEO 445 0.456 1.000 0.836 −1.000 1.000
VA_CFO 407 0.547 1.000 0.795 −1.000 1.000
VOL_CH 448 0.642 1.000 0.709 −1.000 1.000
VOL_CEO 445 0.498 1.000 0.791 −1.000 1.000
VOL_CFO 407 0.603 1.000 0.733 −1.000 1.000
LTD/TD 865 0.664 0.758 0.300 0.000 1.000
Tax 865 0.211 0.266 0.391 −1.717 2.046
Abnormal earnings 865 0.048 0.011 0.323 −0.858 1.917
Firm size 865 12.148 12.125 1.821 8.446 17.132
Liquidity 865 1.484 1.285 0.931 0.376 6.063
M/B asset 865 1.525 1.323 0.738 0.553 4.691
Asset maturity 865 9.388 6.659 11.041 1.318 95.028
Earnings volatility 865 0.114 0.060 0.212 0.003 3.183
Leverage 865 0.208 0.196 0.144 0.002 0.620
Price performance 865 −0.034 0.059 0.563 −1.911 1.213
Panel B: Pairwise correlation matrix (selected variables)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I 1
WE 0.104 1
Net emotion 0.128 0.101 1
Certain1 0.177 0.088 0.145 1
Optimism 0.183 0.112 0.445 0.246 1
Certain2 0.044 0.019 −0.044 0.127 0.063 1
Tone_H −0.021 0.057 0.458 0.047 0.372 −0.025 1
Tone_LM 0.071 0.072 0.612 0.097 0.520 −0.022 0.670 1
TONE 0.126 0.112 0.788 0.261 0.728 0.004 0.774 0.881 1
VA_CH 0.053 −0.053 −0.110 0.050 −0.093 −0.014 −0.064 −0.077 −0.100
VA_CEO 0.032 −0.052 −0.068 −0.071 −0.116 0.005 −0.133 −0.139 −0.147
VA_CFO 0.051 −0.056 −0.081 −0.001 −0.020 −0.083 −0.083 −0.127 −0.098
VOL_CH 0.089 −0.042 −0.097 0.063 −0.065 0.004 −0.065 −0.071 −0.085
VOL_CEO 0.029 −0.041 −0.041 −0.071 −0.119 −0.030 −0.124 −0.129 −0.134
VOL_CFO 0.054 −0.075 −0.069 0.008 −0.027 −0.089 −0.096 −0.126 −0.099
LTD/TD −0.000 0.044 0.092 0.086 0.116 0.002 0.046 0.076 0.109
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
VA_CH 1
VA_CEO 0.477 1
VA_CFO 0.401 0.763 1
VOL_CH 0.951 0.505 0.405 1
VOL_CEO 0.498 0.958 0.758 0.527 1
VOL_CFO 0.432 0.756 0.959 0.446 0.788 1
LTD/TD −0.035 −0.032 −0.043 −0.009 −0.009 −0.033 1
Notes: Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of themain dependent and independent variables. Panel B shows Pearson correlation coeﬃcients
between selected variables (a complete correlation matrix including all variables is available upon request).
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4. Empirical results
4.1. Managerial overconfidence and debtmaturity
This section presents empirical evidence on the impact of the level of overconfidence on the level of debt matu-
rity. More specifically, we examine the effects of two words-based measures of overconfidence: first person
pronouns and optimistic tone.
4.1.1. The role of first person pronouns
Table 2 (Panel A) examines the impact of first person pronouns (I and WE), as proxies for managerial over-
confidence, on debt maturity. The coefficient estimates on the first person singular pronouns (I) are positive
and statistically significant (p-value = .027) in FE regressions. This evidence is consistent with the Hypothesis
1 that overconfidence has a positive effect on debt maturity. Results for the first person plural pronouns (WE)
are more mixed. We find the coefficient estimate onWE is positive but statistically insignificant. The economic
significance of theWE coefficient is also modest. The stronger results for I compared toWE likely reflects that
I is positively associated with narcissism but WE is negatively associated with narcissism which contributes to
overconfidence (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). Although the effect of WE is insignificant in the full sam-
ple, we find, in untabulated tests, that the positive effect of WE on debt maturity is statistically significant at
10% level (p-value = .058) for firm-year observations with below-median leverage but remains insignificant for
other observations with above-median leverage. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that high lever-
age weakens the positive effect of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity. We further test and discuss the
moderating role of leverage in Section 4.3.2.
Next, by taking a closer look at the distribution of I and WE, we find that some firms do not use first per-
son (especially singular) pronouns in their Chairman’s Statement. Over 20% of I in our sample are zero. More
importantly, those zero values of I tend to be in consecutive years, in which case there is no within-firm vari-
ation in the number of I used. Therefore, excluding firm-years with zero I from the sample will make the FE
estimator perform better. As expected, the positive coefficient on I_NON-ZERO is highly significant at 1% level
(p-value = .004) after excluding firm-years with zero I. In addition, around 8% ofWE in our sample are zero.We
also exclude those firm-years with zeroWE. However, the relation betweenWE_NON-ZERO and debt maturity
is still insignificant. To conclude, the highly significant positive effect of I_NON-ZERO on debtmaturity provides
strong support for the hypothesis of positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation (Hypothesis 1).
To sum up, the positive and significant effects of I (model 1), Ln (I+ 1) (model 3) and I_NON-ZERO (model
5) on debt maturity support the prediction of the positive effect of overconfidence hypothesis (Hypothesis 1).
These findings are consistent with overconfidence being beneficial from long-term debt-holders’ perspective
because overconfidence can ameliorate the agency cost of debt (Hackbarth 2009). Thus, consistent with our
Hypothesis 1 overconfident managers have a longer debt maturity than realist managers.
4.1.2. The role of optimistic tone
Table 2 (Panel B) examines the impacts of various measures of optimistic tone of Chairman’s Statement on debt
maturity. Considering that the tone-debt maturity relation might be potentially driven by unobserved time-
invariant firm FE, we present results from FE estimators. Panel B shows that the coefficient estimates on all
individual and composite tone measures are positive but statistically insignificant. However, in untabulated
pooled OLS regressions (available upon request), OPTIMISM and TONE_LM have positive and statistically
highly significant impacts on debt maturity (p-value = .004 and .028, respectively). In addition, the coefficients
on two composite tone indices, TONE and TONE_RES, are also positive and statistically highly significant at 1%
level (p-value = .002 and .001, respectively) without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Taken together,
the positive tone-debt maturity relation is statistically highly significant in the OLS regressions but appears to be
insignificant after controlling for firm FE in the FE regressions. This observation indicates the existence of man-
agerial FE that may drive firm policies as documented in Bertrand and Schoar (2003). Furthermore, Davis et al.
(2015) find that the tone of earnings conference calls is also influenced bymanagerial ‘style’ (i.e.manager-specific
factors such as gender and early career experiences). To conclude, the positive tone-debtmaturity relation seems
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Table 2. Words-based measures of overconﬁdence and debt maturity.
Panel A: The eﬀects of ﬁrst person pronouns on debt maturity
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE
I 0.046**
[0.027]
WE 0.003
[0.686]
Ln(I+ 1) 0.071*
[0.066]
Ln(WE+ 1) 0.021
[0.386]
I_NON-ZERO 0.051***
[0.004]
WE_NON-ZERO −0.002
[0.786]
Tax −0.007 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.010 −0.010
[0.631] [0.598] [0.624] [0.596] [0.563] [0.530]
Abnormal earning −0.008 −0.005 −0.008 −0.005 0.012 0.001
[0.745] [0.846] [0.771] [0.853] [0.732] [0.971]
Firm size 0.058** 0.058** 0.059** 0.058** 0.057 0.058*
[0.040] [0.037] [0.038] [0.039] [0.106] [0.064]
Liquidity 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.154***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M/B asset 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.023 0.011
[0.748] [0.782] [0.762] [0.762] [0.401] [0.625]
Asset maturity −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.823] [0.827] [0.806] [0.801] [0.797] [0.823]
Earnings volatility 0.094 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.074 0.087
[0.170] [0.176] [0.169] [0.178] [0.252] [0.222]
Leverage 0.353** 0.352** 0.349** 0.355** 0.394** 0.404**
[0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.017] [0.013]
Price performance 0.030* 0.031* 0.031* 0.031* 0.009 0.027
[0.068] [0.058] [0.066] [0.059] [0.612] [0.114]
Constant −0.358 −0.348 −0.369 −0.362 −0.380 −0.350
[0.307] [0.312] [0.296] [0.302] [0.384] [0.359]
Obs. 865 865 865 865 685 795
Firms 192 192 192 192 180 184
R2 0.143 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.139 0.151
Panel B: The eﬀects of optimistic tone on debt maturity
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE
Optimism 0.003
[0.393]
Tone_LM 0.021
[0.548]
TONE 0.002
[0.708]
TONE_RES 0.002
[0.714]
Tax −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009
[0.605] [0.588] [0.599] [0.597]
Abnormal earning 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
[0.688] [0.670] [0.681] [0.683]
Firm size 0.059** 0.059** 0.059** 0.059**
[0.031] [0.030] [0.033] [0.032]
Liquidity 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M/B asset 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013
[0.552] [0.576] [0.566] [0.522]
Asset maturity −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[0.723] [0.696] [0.716] [0.716]
Earnings volatility 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072
[0.229] [0.218] [0.223] [0.223]
(continued).
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Table 2. Continued.
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE
Leverage 0.358** 0.352** 0.352** 0.349**
[0.028] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031]
Price performance 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.022
[0.211] [0.236] [0.223] [0.181]
Constant −0.560 −0.357 −0.342 −0.344
[0.197] [0.291] [0.320] [0.315]
Obs. 865 865 865 865
Firms 192 192 192 192
R2 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.156
Notes: This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on ﬁrst person pronouns (Panel A) and various tone measures of Chairman’s
Statement (Panel B) and control variables, as deﬁned in Appendix A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e.
LTD/TD). All themodels are estimatedusingﬁxedeﬀects (FE).p-values aregiven inparentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
to be driven by firm/managerial FE. The implication of this observation is that it is important to control for firm
FE when examining the effect of tone on firm policies.
4.2. Change inmanagerial overconfidence and change in debtmaturity
Prior behavioural corporate finance literature focuses primarily on static overconfidence measures. Recall that
overconfidence can vary over time because of SAB, thus time-variations inmanagerial overconfidence are poten-
tially extremely important. However, static overconfidence measures predominate in the behavioural corporate
finance literature. Malmendier and Tate’s (2005, 2008) option-based and press-based overconfidence measures
are widely used, both of which are static measures. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) examine the relation
between static survey-based overconfidence measure and debt maturity. Landier and Thesmar (2009) find that
their survey-based optimism measure (i.e. expectation errors) tend to persist over the two time periods (i.e.
years 1994 and 1998) they examine and do not provide evidence on the effect of changes of optimism on debt
maturity. Thus, the effect of time-variation in overconfidence is largely under-researched.
In this section, we examine the effect of change in overconfidence on the change in debt maturity.33 This is
an important and novel extension of the existing literature on behavioural corporate financing. We need time-
varying measures of overconfidence, such as the words-based measures examined in this paper to conduct this
analysis. We can therefore shed new light on the question: how sensitive are changes in debt maturity to changes
in overconfidence?
In Table 3, we examine the changes of words-based overconfidence measures on the change in debt maturity
using OLS regressions with first-differenced data. Consistent with our main result in Table 2 that I has a sig-
nificantly positive effect on debt maturity,  I also has a positive and highly significant effect (p-value = .011)
on the change of debt maturity. In addition, we find that the changes in several tone measures, including 
TONE_LM and TONE_RES, have positive and statistically significant impacts on the change in debt maturity
(p-value = .078 and .100, respectively).34 In brief, the above evidence shows that the increase in the level of
words-based managerial overconfidence is significantly associated with increase in debt maturity. This obser-
vation supports the agency cost hypothesis of a positive relation between overconfidence and debt maturity
(Hypothesis 1). More broadly, we provide new and novel evidence that time-variation in managerial overcon-
fidence can have an important impact on corporate financing; thus the impact of time-variation in managerial
overconfidence in other corporate finance contexts would be a fertile line for future research.
4.3. Further analysis of themoderating effects ofmanagers’ identity, investment opportunities and
leverage
4.3.1. The role of NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO
This section ismotivated by the fact that directors have different core duties (Malmendier andZheng 2012).Most
existing studies focus on biased beliefs of CEOs. This is because CEO is often considered as the key corporate
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Table 3. Changes of words-based measures of overconﬁdence and change of debt maturity.
Variable (1) FD (2) FD (3) FD (4) FD (5) FD (6) FD
 I 0.049**
[0.011]
WE 0.001
[0.841]
 Optimism 0.004
[0.288]
 Tone_LM 0.059*
[0.078]
 TONE 0.010
[0.108]
 TONE_RES 0.009*
[0.100]
 Tax 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008
[0.424] [0.489] [0.484] [0.491] [0.521] [0.533]
 Abnormal earnings −0.010 −0.006 −0.005 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
[0.756] [0.837] [0.871] [0.941] [0.923] [0.920]
 Firm size −0.014 −0.011 −0.007 −0.012 −0.011 −0.010
[0.835] [0.864] [0.907] [0.847] [0.857] [0.864]
 Liquidity 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.158***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
M/B asset 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.023
[0.339] [0.351] [0.387] [0.450] [0.460] [0.372]
 Asset maturity 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.787] [0.854] [0.868] [0.916] [0.888] [0.886]
 Earnings volatility 0.075* 0.073* 0.071* 0.066* 0.066 0.065
[0.077] [0.087] [0.089] [0.096] [0.102] [0.104]
 Leverage 0.160 0.162 0.171 0.172 0.184 0.172
[0.294] [0.291] [0.269] [0.262] [0.242] [0.266]
 Price performance −0.010 −0.009 −0.009 −0.013 −0.012 −0.004
[0.569] [0.618] [0.600] [0.461] [0.504] [0.781]
Constant 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
[0.516] [0.556] [0.560] [0.478] [0.482] [0.481]
Obs. 663 663 663 663 663 663
Firms 192 192 192 192 192 192
R2 0.150 0.142 0.144 0.148 0.146 0.147
Notes: This table presents regressions of change of debt maturity measure on the changes of ﬁrst person pronouns and various tone measures of
Chairman’s Statement and control variables, as deﬁned in Appendix A. The dependent variable is the change of ratio of long-term debt to total
debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using ﬁrst diﬀerence (FD) estimator (i.e. ﬁrst-diﬀerenced data with OLS regression). p-values
are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
decision-maker (Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013). On the other hand, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013)
document that CFO’s biased beliefs also have significant influence on various corporate policies. Malmendier
and Zheng’s (2012) empirical analysis suggests that CEO’s havemost influence upon investment decisions, while
CFO has a greater effect on equity issuance. If the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation is driven by
reducing the agency cost of debt (i.e. underinvestment problem) then the overconfidence of director who has
greatest influence over investment decisions, the CEO, should play a more significant role in increasing debt
maturity.
Table 4 reports the results regarding the impact of NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO on debt maturity. The
coefficients on both value-based and volume-based NPRs of CEO are significantly positive (p-value = .062 and
.076, respectively). However, the NPRs of CFO are insignificant. The NPRs of Chairman are also insignificant,
which is perhaps not surprising considering that most of the UK Chairmen are non-executive directors. These
results suggest that the Chairman’s Statement in the annual reports does not only reflect Chairman’s overcon-
fident belief but also that of senior managers, especially the CEO;35 this interpretation is consistent with prior
research (Clatworthy and Jones 2003, 2006). The positive significant relation found for the CEO (only) is con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2 that the overconfidence of CEOs, who have a greater influence upon investment policy
(Malmendier and Zheng 2012), has a more significant and positive effect on debt maturity.36
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Table 4. Action-based measures of overconﬁdence and debt maturity.
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE
VA_CH −0.016
[0.274]
VA_CEO 0.032*
[0.062]
VA_CFO −0.015
[0.456]
VOL_CH −0.012
[0.505]
VOL_CEO 0.037*
[0.076]
VOL_CFO −0.014
[0.533]
Tax −0.035 −0.014 −0.009 −0.035 −0.013 −0.009
[0.199] [0.556] [0.666] [0.202] [0.563] [0.657]
Abnormal earning −0.030 −0.067 −0.067 −0.030 −0.068 −0.067
[0.384] [0.127] [0.140] [0.386] [0.123] [0.140]
Firm size 0.132*** 0.065* 0.035 0.131*** 0.063* 0.037
[0.001] [0.080] [0.435] [0.001] [0.088] [0.412]
Liquidity 0.157*** 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.156*** 0.193*** 0.185***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004]
M/B asset 0.029 −0.021 0.010 0.031 −0.020 0.011
[0.332] [0.593] [0.756] [0.303] [0.606] [0.737]
Asset maturity 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000
[0.445] [0.414] [0.900] [0.448] [0.393] [0.901]
Earnings volatility 0.040 0.050 0.219 0.040 0.050 0.221
[0.355] [0.332] [0.299] [0.365] [0.321] [0.301]
Leverage 0.118 0.595*** 0.527** 0.119 0.592*** 0.524**
[0.490] [0.007] [0.017] [0.491] [0.008] [0.017]
Price performance 0.018 0.052** 0.037 0.017 0.052** 0.037
[0.501] [0.040] [0.141] [0.504] [0.044] [0.142]
Constant −1.257*** −0.540 −0.151 −1.245*** −0.517 −0.176
[0.007] [0.255] [0.792] [0.007] [0.274] [0.760]
Obs. 448 445 407 448 445 407
Firms 162 156 141 162 156 141
R2 0.179 0.233 0.144 0.178 0.234 0.143
Notes: This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on the NPRs of Chairman, CEO and CFO and control variables, as deﬁned in
Appendix A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects
(FE). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
However, onemay argue that the insider trading activitiesmay reflect directors’ private information,meaning
that insiders with positive private information tend to purchasemore their own firm’s shares and are reluctant to
sell, which in turn increases theNPR.However, this alternative interpretation is not consistentwith our empirical
results. Based on the signalling model, managers will signal the quality of their firms by issuing short-term debt
(Flannery 1986). In this case, managers with positive private information, as indicated by high NPR, should
use more short-term debt. This prediction, from the signalling model, is contradicted by the observed positive
and significant relation between the NPRs of CEO and debt maturity. Thus, we tentatively suggest our evidence
based on NPRs of CEO is not driven by private information.
4.3.2. Themoderating effects of investment opportunities and leverage
We perform subsample analysis to examine the sensitivity of overconfidence-debt maturity relation to several
firm characteristics. The goal here is to examine if there is further support for the agency cost of debtmechanism
that we hypothesise to have been driving the observed positive relation between overconfidence and debt matu-
rity. Table 5 presents subsample analysis where the full sample is split into two subsamples based on measures
of investment opportunities (market-to-book value of asset and market-to-book value of equity) and a measure
of long-term debt capacity (leverage). This subsample analysis can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of
the overconfidence-debt maturity relation by looking at the sensitivity of overconfidence-debt maturity relation
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Table 5. The moderating eﬀects of investment opportunities and leverage.
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FD (4) FD (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE
Panel A: M/B asset High Low High Low High Low High Low
I 0.055* 0.014
[0.095] [0.634]
 I 0.049** 0.069*
[0.030] [0.052]
CEO_VA 0.049** 0.018
[0.046] [0.412]
CEO_VOL 0.056* 0.018
[0.069] [0.445]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.162 0.163 0.166 0.125 0.250 0.269 0.252 0.268
Obs. 433 432 321 342 209 236 209 236
Panel B: M/B equity
I 0.065* 0.057
[0.058] [0.111]
 I 0.060** 0.054*
[0.014] [0.093]
CEO_VA 0.048* 0.042**
[0.067] [0.046]
CEO_VOL 0.054* 0.042*
[0.088] [0.088]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.179 0.146 0.159 0.133 0.321 0.238 0.322 0.237
Obs. 432 433 324 339 219 226 219 226
Panel C: Leverage
I 0.043 0.060**
[0.186] [0.049]
 I 0.045* 0.067**
[0.061] [0.032]
CEO_VA 0.008 0.066*
[0.619] [0.070]
CEO_VOL 0.011 0.067*
[0.614] [0.095]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.389 0.088 0.322 0.073 0.404 0.205 0.405 0.203
Obs. 433 432 333 330 222 223 222 223
Notes: This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on ﬁrst person pronouns and NPRs of CEO and control variables, as deﬁned in
Appendix A. Subsamples split based on the medians of market-to-book value of asset (Panel A), market-to-book value of equity (Panel B) and
leverage (Panel C) are estimated to examine the impacts of the above ﬁrm characteristics on the overconﬁdence-debt maturity relation. All ﬁrm
level control variables are included in all models but not reported to save space. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total
debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) or ﬁrst diﬀerence (FD) estimator. p-Values are given in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate that coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
to the above firm characteristics. Our subsample analysis focuses on three overconfidence measures: first per-
son singular pronouns (I) and the NPRs of CEO (CEO_VA and CEO_VOL) which have positive and significant
impacts on debt maturity in our main tests in Tables 2 and 4, respectively.
Market-to-book value: Firms with more investment opportunities, as indicated by higher market-to-book
value of asset or equity, have more severe agency problem of underinvestment (i.e. debt overhang). Put dif-
ferently, the fewer investment opportunities, the less severe the potential conflict over the exercise of those
investment options. If overconfidence influences debt maturity through the agency channel, we expect that the
overconfidence-debt maturity relation will be stronger for high-growth firms which are associated with more
underinvestment problem. Consistent withHypothesis 3, Table 5 shows that the coefficients on both I andNPRs
of CEO are more significant for firms with higher market-to-book value of asset. These results are generally
robust to an alternative measure of investment opportunities that is market-to-book value of equity.
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Leverage: If a firm’s leverage is high, according to trade-off theory of capital structure, the firmwill be reluctant
to usemore debt. In other words, only firms with relatively low leverage will use debt and thus have tomake debt
maturity decision. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation is found to
be stronger for firms with lower leverage (see Table 5). Thus, we find that the overconfidence-debt maturity
relation is intensified for firms that do not face long-term debt capacity constraints.
To summarise, ourmajor finding is that the effect of managerial overconfidence is stronger when the firm has
high growth opportunities. This supports ourmain agency cost hypothesis (that builds on the timing effect from
Hackbarth’s 2009 model), which posits that managerial overconfidence can reduce underinvestment problem,
in a novel scenario where the underinvestment problem is exacerbated, that is, for firms with more growth
opportunities. In addition, high leverage makes firms less likely to use debt, which in turns weakens the positive
overconfident-debt maturity relation.
4.4. Can other agency problems be alternative explanations?
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, if the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity can
be explained by the risk-shifting problem, we expect that this positive relation is stronger for firms with higher
risk-shifting incentives as indicated by deteriorating firm performance (Hypothesis 5). Inconsistent with this
hypothesis, Table 6 shows that the positive coefficients on overconfidence measures are generally stronger for
better-performing firms with higher abnormal earnings (Panel A), higher average sales growth in the past five
years (Panel B) and higher price performance (Panel C).
In addition, based on Section 2.2.3, the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt matu-
ritymay also be explained by the overinvestment problem if we find thatmanagerial overconfidence significantly
increases leverage. However, inconsistent with Hypothesis 6, we do not find significantly positive associations
between ourmanagerial overconfidencemeasures and leverage. In results, available upon request, only theNPR-
based overconfidence measures have positive but insignificant effects on leverage, while all the word-based
overconfidence measures have negative effects on leverage. This finding is not surprising because overconfident
managers may use debt conservatively (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011). Overall, the above analysis suggests
that neither risk-shifting nor overinvestment can explain the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relation.
4.5. Robustness tests
We conduct a series of robustness tests in Table 7 based on alternative debt maturity measures, overconfidence
measures, estimation methods, and controlling for ownership structure.
Alternative debt maturity measures: First, we attempt to construct an alternative debt maturity measure using
more detailed long-term debt data, including debt that matures in greater than 5 years and less than 10 years
(WC18284) and debt that matures in greater than 10 years (WC18285). These two data items have been unfortu-
nately discontinued by theWorldscope and are only available up to 2004. We create an alternative debt maturity
measure, also used in the early UK studies (e.g. Ozkan 2000), namely LTD5/TD. LTD5/TD is the ratio of debt
that matures in over five years to total debt. In Panel A (models 1–4) of Table 7, we examine the effect of man-
agerial overconfidence on LTD5/TD over the subperiod 2000–2004. The coefficients on first person singular
pronouns (I) and CEO_VA and CEO_VOL are positive and statistically significant. In addition, in models 5–8,
we use the ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities (LTL/TL) as an alternative measure of debt maturity
and find consistent results. Thus, the positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity is
robust to the alternative measures of debt maturity.
Alternative overconfidence measures: In untabulated tests (available upon request), we regress debt maturity
on binary variables based on first person singular pronoun (I) and NPRs of CEO. I_DUMMY is coded as 1
if I is in the top decile and 0 otherwise. CEO_NPD is net purchase dummy which takes the value of 1 if the
NPRs of CEO are above zero and 0 otherwise. Consistent with our main findings, I_DUMMY has a positive and
significant effect (p-value = .053) on debt maturity in FE regressions. In addition, the coefficients onCEO_NPD
are positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, the positive relation between overconfidence and
debt maturity is robust to alternative measures of I and NPRs of CEO.
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Table 6. Can the overconﬁdence-debt maturity relation be explained by the risk-shifting problem.
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FD (4) FD (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE
Panel A: Abnormal earnings High Low High Low High Low High Low
I 0.075* −0.003
[0.059] [0.927]
 I 0.062** 0.052**
[0.039] [0.048]
CEO_VA 0.062** 0.011
[0.044] [0.766]
CEO_VOL 0.077** 0.014
[0.030] [0.745]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.180 0.120 0.158 0.104 0.430 0.250 0.430 0.250
Obs. 432 433 330 333 229 216 229 216
Panel B: Average sales growth
I 0.072** 0.015
[0.040] [0.579]
 I 0.085*** 0.029
[0.002] [0.277]
CEO_VA 0.031 0.031
[0.145] [0.219]
CEO_VOL 0.040 0.030
[0.129] [0.289]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.140 0.190 0.138 0.162 0.350 0.200 0.350 0.290
Obs. 458 407 344 319 204 241 204 241
Panel C: Price performance
I 0.063* 0.013
[0.092] [0.587]
 I 0.081*** 0.032
[0.001] [0.278]
CEO_VA 0.021 0.025
[0.263] [0.415]
CEO_VOL 0.019 0.026
[0.389] [0.410]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.140 0.140 0.110 0.170 0.210 0.320 0.210 0.320
Obs. 432 433 335 328 216 229 216 229
Notes: This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on ﬁrst person pronouns and NPRs of CEO and control variables, as deﬁned
in Appendix A. Subsamples split based on the medians of abnormal earnings (a proxy for ﬁrm quality) in Panel A, average sales growth in
the past ﬁve years in Panel B and price performance in Panel C are estimated to examine the impacts of the above ﬁrm characteristics on the
overconﬁdence-debt maturity relation. All ﬁrm level control variables are included in all models but not reported to save space. The dependent
variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) or ﬁrst diﬀerence (FD)
estimator. p-Values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Alternative estimationmethods: First, to address a potential endogeneity concern that debtmaturity and lever-
age may be jointly endogenous variables, following Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) we conduct the
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis where these two variables are simultaneously determined.
Specifically, we control for the predicted leverage, estimated from the first-stage regression, in the second-stage
regression where the dependent variable is debt maturity. Consistent with the results from the FE regressions,
the positive coefficients on our main overconfidence measures are still significant in the second stage of 2SLS in
models 1–4 of Panel B. Second, we use RE-Tobit estimator because the debt maturity ratio is bounded between
zero and one.37 We also find consistent results from the RE-Tobit regressions in models 5–6 of Panel B.38
Controlling for ownership structure: A potential limitation of our empirical analysis so far is that we do not
incorporate any directmeasure of corporate governance, although any time-invariant governance characteristics
are controlled using the FE estimator. We use two measures of ownership structure as additional control vari-
ables.39 We first control for insider ownership concentration, constructed as the number of closely held shares
THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE 175
Table 7. Robustness tests.
Panel A: Alternative debt maturity measures
Dependent variable = LTD5/TD Dependent variable = LTL/TL
(1) FE (2) FD (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FD (7) FE (8) FE
I 0.066* 0.026**
[0.092] [0.023]
 I 0.029 0.031***
[0.102] [0.001]
CEO_VA 0.078*** 0.034*
[0.006] [0.055]
CEO_VOL 0.089*** 0.037*
[0.006] [0.066]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.090 0.121 0.500 0.510 0.260 0.187 0.280 0.280
Obs. 231 144 99 99 865 663 445 445
Panel B: Alternative estimation methods
(1)–(4) 2SLS (second-stage regressions) (5)–(8) RE-Tobit
I 0.046** 0.034*
[0.029] [0.090]
 I 0.057*** 0.085***
[0.009] [0.004]
CEO_VA 0.033* 0.031*
[0.075] [0.052]
CEO_VOL 0.038* 0.034**
[0.062] [0.047]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.142 0.085 0.232 0.233
Log likelihood −36.42 −256.40 −33.74 −33.64
Obs. 865 663 407 407 865 663 445 445
Panel C: Controlling for ownership structure
(1) FE (2) FD (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FD (7) FE (8) FE
I 0.047** 0.061*
[0.025] [0.080]
 I 0.060*** 0.076***
[0.002] [0.007]
CEO_VA 0.032* 0.027
[0.066] [0.236]
CEO_VOL 0.036* 0.027
[0.080] [0.301]
Insider ownership −0.000 −0.002* 0.000 0.000
[0.792] [0.090] [0.692] [0.709]
Managerial 0.000 −0.001 0.007*** 0.007***
ownership [0.824] [0.624] [0.002] [0.002]
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.140 0.127 0.230 0.230 0.180 0.119 0.290 0.290
Obs. 863 661 445 445 436 287 223 223
Notes: This table presents various robustness tests. Panel A reports the effects of first person pronouns andNPRs of CEO, respectively,
on two alternative measures of debt maturity. The dependent variable in models 1–4 is LTD5/TD defined as the ratio of debt that
matures in more than five years to total debt. The dependent variable in models 5–8 is LTL/TL defined as the ratio of long-term
liabilities to total liabilities. Models 1–4 are based on the subperiod 2000–2004 due to limited availability of LTD5/TD. Panel B
reports the results from two alternative estimationmethods. Specifically, models 1–4 use 2SLSwhere debtmaturity and leverage are
simultaneously determined and models 5–8 use RE-Tobit. Panel C controls for insider ownership in models 1–4 and managerial
ownership in models 5–8. All other firm level control variables are included in all models but not reported to save space. The
dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD) in both Panel B and C. All the models in Panel A and
C are estimated using fixed effects (FE) or first difference (FD) estimator. p-Values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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(CHS) as a percentage of total common shares outstanding.Worldscope defines the CHS as shares held by insid-
ers (e.g. directors, firms and individual investors) (see Appendix A for the detailed definition). The CHS is an
important component of the FTSE Institutional Investor Services (ISS) Corporate Governance Index. Doidge,
Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) document that insider ownership has a significantly negative effect on the quality of
governance practices. Controlling for insider ownership, models 1–4 of Panel C show that the coefficients on
various managerial overconfidence measures are still positive and significant.
Second, we control for managerial ownership, defined as the percentage of shares held by executive directors,
which is constructed based on the ownership data from the Hemmington Scott insider trading database. We do
not include both insider ownership and managerial ownership in the same regression simply because insider
ownership also captures the shares held by firm directors. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) argue that
managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers and shareholders and thus is relevant to debt matu-
rity decision.Models 5–6 of Panel C show that the positive effect ofmanagerial overconfidence, asmeasured by I,
on debt maturity is robust to the inclusion of managerial ownership. In addition, controlling for CEO ownership
in untabulated tests, the positive coefficient on I is also statistically significant at 5% level (p-value = .044).
5. Conclusions
This study examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt maturity. We argue that
managerial overconfidence can mitigate the agency cost of long-term debt, especially the Myers (1977) under-
investment problem, by aligning managers’ and debt-holders’ preferences over the firm’s future investments.
This is based on Hackbarth’s (2009) model that overconfident managers invest more and earlier than rational
managers; therefore they are less likely to underinvest. Based on this argument, we hypothesise that overconfi-
dence increase debt maturity. Our study is thus different from Huang, Tan, and Faff (2016) which suggest that
the managerial overconfidence decreases debt maturity from the information asymmetry perspective. We also
contribute to the literature by developing and using time-varying overconfidence measures, which is important
since attribution bias (see Miller and Ross 1975; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998) is a clear mech-
anism through which overconfidence is likely to be time-varying and it also makes it much easier to control for
firm FE.
There are three major findings, supporting the agency cost of debt hypothesis of a positive overconfidence-
debt maturity relation (Hypothesis 1). First, we confirm that there is in general a positive relation between
overconfidence and debt maturity using a wide range of time-varying overconfidence measures and especially
for changes in overconfidence. For example, first person singular pronouns (I) has a significant and positive
impact on debt maturity. In addition, first person plural pronouns (WE) has a significantly positive effect on
debt maturity for firms with below-median leverage. Our findings related to the first person pronouns are con-
sistent with the previous US evidence (Li 2010a). Furthermore, we find that the changes in I and several tone
measures have positive and significant effects on the changes in debt maturity. Second, we examine the role of
different directors’ overconfidence. If the agency cost hypothesis holds, we anticipate the overconfidence of the
director who has most impact on investment decisions, that is, CEO, to be crucial. Consistent with this conjec-
ture (Hypothesis 2), we find that only the NPRs of CEOs, as a proxy for CEO overconfidence, have significantly
positive effects on debt maturity.
Third, we examine a scenario where the underinvestment problem is exacerbated. Consistent with Hypothe-
sis 3, we generally find the positive overconfidence-debtmaturity relation is intensified for firms with potentially
high underinvestment problem as indicated by high investment opportunities. This evidence further supports
our agency cost hypothesis that underinvestment problem is the underlying channel through which managerial
overconfidence increases debt maturity. In addition, we examine the moderating role of financial leverage, con-
sistent with Hypothesis 4, we find that the positive relation between managerial overconfidence, as measured
by I,WE, and CEONPRs, respectively, and debt maturity are statistically and economically more significant for
firm-year observations with below-median leverage, mainly because low-leverage firms are more able to issue
long-term debt. Our further analysis suggests that neither agency issues of risk-shifting (Hypothesis 5) nor over-
investment (Hypothesis 6) are the main channels generating the positive relation between overconfidence and
debt maturity. Instead, this study, overall, supports the view that managerial overconfidence reduces the agency
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cost of debt associated with the underinvestment problem. Thus, managerial overconfidence can have a positive
effect. Future studymay examine the effect ofmanagerial overconfidence on the cost of debt.Moreover, our study
emphasises the importance of controlling for firm FE when examining the effect of managerial overconfidence
on corporate policies, in which case a time-varying overconfidence measure is particularly useful.
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Notes
1. The managerial overconfidence literature builds upon an important finding in the psychological studies that people tend to
be overconfident (Taylor and Brown 1988). Overconfident people may overestimate their own abilities, the precision of their
knowledge/information and the probabilities of good outcomes. In finance, Roll (1986) highlighted the significance of man-
agerial overconfidence (i.e. hubris) in mergers and acquisitions decisions. More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008)
document that managerial overconfidence may lead to value-destroying corporate investments.
2. Overconfidence can benefit shareholders because overconfident CEOs are better innovators (Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012).
3. The underinvestment problem arises when managers forgo good investment opportunities that increase the firm value but not
the value of their shareholders (Myers 1977).
4. Hilary and Hsu (2011) use ‘endogenous overconfidence’ to describe the dynamic self-attribution-induced overconfidence. It is
relevant to note that SAB is usually regarded as a dynamic counterpart of overconfidence (Hirshleifer 2001).
5. It is difficult to capture time-variation inmanagerial overconfidence using a survey approach. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013)
measure optimism of CEOs and CFOs based on their survey in 2006 and Landier and Thesmar (2009) use entrepreneur
optimism measure that is based on two surveys in 1994 and 1998, respectively.
6. The word ‘overconfidence’ has often been used in a broad sense that subsumes several aspects of overconfidence including (1)
miscalibration, that is overestimation of the precision of one’s knowledge or belief, which leads to narrower confidence interval,
(2) better-than-average effect, that is overestimation of one’s ability or positive personal attributes, (3) illusion of control, that
is overestimation of the control one has over events and outcomes (see Ackert and Deaves 2010 for an overview of various
facets of overconfidence). A closely related psychological bias is optimism which makes people overestimate (underestimate)
the probability of good (bad) outcomes. However, overconfidence and optimism are often used interchangeably in the finance
literature.
7. Following the previous literature (e.g.Malmendier andTate 2005;Hackbarth 2009), we also assume that overconfidentmanagers
maximise the perceived current shareholders’ value (or the value of equity).
8. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these two agency problems as potential alternative explanations of the positive
effect of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity.
9. In contrast, managerial overconfidence may exacerbate the overinvestment problem, because overconfident managers who
overestimate the expected payoffs of future investment tend to overinvest (Campbell et al. 2011; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean
2011). This exacerbated overinvestment problem due to managerial overconfidence makes debt investors reluctant to lend
money to firms with overconfident managers. This is particularly true for long-term debt investors because long-term debt,
unlike the short-term debt that often serves as an important tool to monitor managers, is not as effective as short-term debt
in making the managers closely and frequently monitored (e.g. Stulz 2004). Thus, managerial overconfidence makes the firm
rely more on short-term debt and thus is negatively related to debt maturity. This prediction is however inconsistent with our
findings.
10. For a review of debtmaturity hypotheses, see Stohs andMauer (1996) andAntoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006). For a summary
of the debt maturity determinants and their predicted signs, see Table 1 in Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006).
11. Various texts analysed in the finance and accounting literature includeManagementDiscussion andAnalysis (MD&A) (Kothari,
Li, and Short 2009; Li 2010a), CEO interviews (Kim 2013) and earnings announcement (Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman
2011). For a more comprehensive summary of textual analysis studies, see Appendix A2 in Li (2010b).
12. Li (2010a) uses the percentage of first person pronouns as an alternative proxy for the SAB and finds similar results.
13. Self-attribution bias takes the following two forms (Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer 1983): (1) enhancing attribution, meaning
that success is attributed to internal factors and (2) defensive attribution, meaning that failure is attributed to external factors.
In terms of Li’s self-attribution measure, the first person (second-and third-person) pronouns are used to capture the enhanc-
ing (defensive) attribution. However, we believe that the second- and third-person pronouns are probably noisy/incomplete
measures of defensive attribution, considering that Chairman may attribute failure to many external factors (e.g. the economy)
without using any second- and third-person pronouns (Li 2010a). Therefore, our study focuses on self-referencing (i.e. the
enhancing attribution) as time-varying measure of managerial overconfidence.
14. A narcissistic personality is considered as a contributor to hubris (i.e. exaggerated self-confidence) (Hayward and Hambrick
1997; Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007). More specifically, narcissism is associated with ‘relative optimism and confidence about
positive outcomes’ (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007).
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15. We find that neither the first person pronouns (i.e. the sum of I and WE) nor the ratio of I to WE is statistically significantly
related to debt maturity.
16. Tone analysis (and more generally textual analysis) is becoming increasingly popular in recent accounting and finance studies.
For example, Rogers, VanBuskirk, andZechman (2011) examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation.
For a review on studies of corporate disclosures, please see Li (2010a).
17. In Diction, optimism is defined as ‘language endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive
entailments’.
18. As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when calculating a particular item. In particular,
we compare our collected Chairman’s Statements to three alternative norms in Diction including (1) all cases, (2) corporate
financial reports and (3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are qualitatively similar using alternative norms.
19. The terms ‘positive/negative’ and ‘optimistic/pessimistic’ are often used interchangeably in the literature (e.g. Davis, Piger, and
Sedor 2012). Li (2010b) standardise the terms to ‘positive/negative’ instead of ‘optimistic/pessimistic’.
20. An earlier version of LIWC has a category named ‘optimism’, however in the 2007 version words are classified more broadly
into ‘positive emotion’ and ‘negative emotion’.
21. In Diction, certainty is defined as ‘language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency to speak ex
cathedra’.
22. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 2.59, explains 43.2% of our sample variance. The eigenvalue of second component
is close to one.
23. In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g. current performance, growth opportunities, operating risks and complexity), Huang,
Teoh, and Zhang (2014) find that tone, as measured using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, is positively related to
market-to-book and volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, age and number of business segments. Our
orthogonalised tone measure (TONE_RES) controls for all standard determinants of debt maturity.
24. The first component explains 41.3% of the sample variance. The eigenvalues of first and second components are 2.48 and 1.16,
respectively.
25. One may ask why our linguistic analysis only focuses on Chairman’s Statement, given that other narratives, for example, CEO
review, financial review, business review and operational review, might also be available in the annual report. However, these
reviews are relatively less standard, meaning that (a) not every firm provides statements made by CEO and CFO separately and
(b) the structure, content and length of their statements vary greatly from firm to firm.
26. Many previous studies on the UK accounting narratives focus on Chairman’s Statement (see, e.g. Smith and Taffler 2000;
Clatworthy and Jones 2003, 2006). Smith and Taffler (2000) use Chairman’s Statement to predict firm bankruptcy.
27. For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue that accounting narratives such as the UK Chairman’s Statement allow ‘man-
agement’ to describe corporate financial performance. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) also argue that managers tend to ‘elaborate
on positive financial performance in the Chairman’s Statement’.
28. To address this concern, we conduct some supplementary tests to check whether the Chairman’s Statement reflects the beliefs
of other members of the board of directors. We choose a random subsample of 300 annual reports from our main sample. We
require that these reports have both Chairman’s Statement and CEO’s review available in them. We then examine whether
the language dimensions constructed based on those two statements are similar. We find that pairwise correlation coefficients
of the following variables: OPTIMISM (0.23), TONE_LM (0.43), NET EMOTION (0.46) and the tone index, TONE (0.49), I
(0.24) and WE (0.45) are all statistically significant at 1% level. In addition, we investigate whether language used in CEO’s
review has a significant effect on the language used in Chairman’s Statement. We regress language dimensions of Chairman’s
Statement on their counterparts constructed based on CEO’s review. As expected, all language dimensions constructed based
on CEO’s reviews have positive and statistically significant impacts on those based on Chairman’s Statement. Overall, based
on the existing literature and on our supplementary tests, we assume that the measures based on the Chairman’s Statement are
good, albeit imperfect, proxies for managerial overconfidence.
29. In terms of the procedure of content analysis, we first extract Chairman’s Statements from annual reports. Next, we detect
transformation errors in the combined text file using the Spelling and Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally,
various types of errors (examples are available upon request) are corrected before the texts are inputted in the LIWC 2007.
30. Due to data availability, the tests of the roles of the NPR of individual directors are based on a smaller sample.
31. TheHemmington Scott database provides insider trading data from 1994. However, our sampling procedure ends up with very
few observations between 1994 and 1999. That is why our sample period starts in 2000.
32. Stock price is found to be interrelated with the presence of the self-attribution. Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer (1983) document
that good prior stock performance may lead to more enhancing attributions, followed by subsequent stock price increases.
33. Words-based overconfidencemeasures (including first person pronouns and especially tonemeasures) are quite volatile. Specif-
ically, for example, the within, between and overall standard deviation of Tone_LM are 0.216, 0.195 and 0.290, respectively, and
the mean and standard deviation of the yearly average of Tone_LM are 0.533 and 0.084, respectively.
34. The NPRs display relatively little time variation and hence we do not report the impact of a change in NPR here. For example,
over 60% of the NPRs take the value of one.
35. The results for CEO are positive (consistent with all words-based measures) and significant (consistent with some words-based
measures), while the results for CFO and Chairman do not have the same sign as those for the words-based measures.
36. In unreported results, we examined the NPRs of all the executive directors. These results confirm a positive relation between
executive directors’ overconfidence and debt maturity supporting Hypothesis 1.
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37. The RE-Tobit is estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature and our results are robust to quadrature sensitivity. We use the
‘quadchk’ command to check whether the coefficients change substantially using different numbers of integration points.
38. In untabulated tests, we use two-step system-GMM to address potential endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we examine a
dynamic model where we control for the lagged debt maturity. The coefficients on the lagged debt maturity are around 0.35 and
statistically significant, suggesting that the adjustment speed of debt maturity is reasonably high. Consistent with our previous
results, the coefficients on two overconfidence measures, I and VA_CEO are positive and statistically significant at 10% level.
However, the Sargan tests reject the validity of our internal instruments. Furthermore, as pointed out by Roodman (2009), the
GMM results should be aggressively tested for sensitivity to different numbers of instruments. Unfortunately, our GMM results
also seem to be sensitive to different lag structures.
39. A detailed examination of the effects of a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables is beyond the scope of this
study. Future study may attempt to examine the implications of other corporate governance variables, including various board
characteristics.
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Appendix A Variable definitions
Variables Definition
Panel A: words-based measure of overconfidence: first person pronouns
I The percentage of first person singular pronouns in the Chairman’s Statement
WE The percentage of first person plural pronouns in the Chairman’s Statement
Panel B: words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger and sadness) as
defined by LIWC
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive processes as
defined by LIWC
Optimism [praise+ satisfaction+ inspiration]−[blame+ hardship+ denial] as defined by
Diction
Certain2 [tenacity+ leveling+ collectives+ insistence]−[numerical
terms+ ambivalence+ self-reference+ variety] as defined by Diction
Tone_H The ratio of (positive words-negative words) to (positive words+ negative words),
based on Henry’s (2008) word lists. Examples of positive (negative) words are
positive, success, improve, etc. (negative, fail, worsen, etc.).
Tone_LM The ratio of (positive words−negative words) to (positive words+ negative words),
based on Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) word lists. Examples of positive
(negative) words are enhance, excellent, profitable, etc. (weak, poor, loss, etc.).
TONE Composite tone index (see Section 3.2.2 for more descriptions)
TONE_RES Orthogonalised tone index (see Section 3.2.2 for more descriptions)
Panel C: action-based measure of overconfidence: NPR, defined as the difference between insider purchases
and sales divided by the sum of insider purchases and sales of own firm’s shares
VA_CH The value-based NPR of Chairman
VA_CEO The value-based NPR of CEO
VA_CFO The value-based NPR of CFO
VOL_CH The volume-based NPR of Chairman
VOL_CEO The volume-based NPR of CEO
VOL_CFO The volume-based NPR of CFO
Panel D: firm characteristics
LTD/TD The ratio of long-term debt that matures in more than one year to total debt
LTD5/TD The ratio of long-term debt that matures in more than five years to total debt
LTL/TL The ratio of long-term liabilities to total liabilities
Tax The ratio of income taxes to pre-tax income
Abnormal earnings The difference between next year’s and this year’s earnings per share, scaled by this
year’s stock price
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets
Liquidity The ratio of current assets to current liability
M/B asset The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value
of equity to book value of total assets
M/B equity The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity
Asset maturity The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to depreciation expense
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years (at least
three years), scaled by the average book value of assets
Leverage The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets
Price performance The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices
Average sales growth The average sales growth rate in the past five years
Insider ownership The number of closely held shares (CHS) as a percentage of total common shares
outstanding. Worldscope defines the CHS as shares held by insiders including
senior corporate officers, directors and their immediate families; trusts; any other
corporation; pension/benefit plans; individuals who hold 5% or more of shares
outstanding.
Managerial ownership The percentage of shares held by executive directors
